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Abstract 
In this study, we focused on the Generic Overgeneralisation 
(GOG) effect (Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg 2011) and 
tested the relevance of context and an explanation based on 
quantifier domain restriction for the pattern of judgement data 
observed. Participants judged generic majority characteristic 
statements like tigers have stripes or statements with 
universal quantifiers that have different sensitivity to context 
(‘all’, ‘all the’, ‘each’) preceded by one of three levels of 
context: a) neutral, where the information in the context does 
not interact with the truth value of the critical statement, b) 
contradictory, where it presents an exception which should 
rule out a universally quantified statement, and c) supportive. 
Our results suggest that proponents of the generics-as-default 
view ruled out context prematurely and that in fact context is 
a viable alternative explanation for much of the so-called 
GOG effect. 
Keywords: context; generalisation; genericity; quantification; 
quantifier domain restriction  
Introduction 
Quantificational generalisations, as in (1), are expressed in 
quantitative, statistical terms, while generic generalisations, 
as in (2)-(3), make general claims about kinds of entities 
and refer to a property that is characteristic of the kind in 
question, but not necessarily statistically prevalent, as in (3): 
 
(1) Some lions live in cages. 
(2) Lions roar. 
(3) Lions have manes. 
 
Generic generalisations have long been studied in formal 
semantics, within which genericity is frequently viewed as a 
species of quantification. Even though generics have been 
studied since the seventies (see Dahl 1975; Carlson 1977), 
how to characterise their semantic interpretation and how to 
model their truth conditions remains a controversial topic 
(see discussion in Mari, Beyssade, and del Prete 2013). 
Within formal semantics, modal logic and probabilistic 
approaches are most prominent, both of which treat 
genericity as akin to quantification. According to the modal 
approach, which is the most widely adopted formal analysis 
of genericity, generic meaning is obtained as the effect of an 
underlying operator or quantifier dubbed ‘GEN’, which is 
not phonologically realised but which is active in the 
composition of the sentence meaning and is an unselective 
variable binding operator similar to adverbs of 
quantification like usually, typically, always, as analysed in 
Lewis (1975). This operator is sentential and is represented 
by a tripartite structure as in (4) (Krifka et al. 1995). Thus, 
the logical form of (2) may be given as follows in (5): 
 
(4) GEN  [restrictor] [matrix] 
(5) GENx [Lions (x)] [Roar (x)] 
 
Generic generalisations can be made using a wide range of 
different grammatical means, including definite and 
indefinite singulars and bare plurals in English, but no 
language has a unique, unambiguous marker of genericity 
equivalent to a quantifier or determiner. It is important to 
note that none of the analyses that posit a ‘GEN’ operator 
offer an explanation for this, a point that a recent 
psychological approach to generics, capitalises upon.  
This growing body of experimental and developmental 
psychological work on the topic proposes that genericity is 
categorically different from (and significantly simpler than) 
quantification (Leslie 2007, 2008, Gelman 2010). This latter 
hypothesis, called the Generics-as-Default view (GaD view 
henceforth), treats generics as an innate and default mode of 
thinking. This idea is linked to the 2-system view of 
cognition argued for by Kahneman and Frederick (2002) 
among others, which includes a distinction between System 
1, a fast, automatic, effortless lower-level system, and 
System 2, a slower, more effortful higher-level rule-
governed system. According to this view, the fact that no 
language has a dedicated overt ‘GEN’ operator does not 
come as a surprise: given that generics are the most 
primitive default generalisations, children do not need to 
learn anything in order to acquire them. 
The GaD approach argues that the fact that there is no 
overt generic operator in any known language is because 
generics are the unmarked, System 1, case. On this view, 
only effortful, non-default quantificational generalisations 
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require overt linguistic exponence. However, while 
assigning generics to a more basic, unmarked System 1, 
mode of thinking may sound intuitive at some level, it rests 
on a vague and undefined notion of markedness. Leslie 
refers to Chomsky (2000), but she gives no definition of 
markedness. Intuitively, it seems that what is at stake is 
surface level overt realisation (third notion of markedness of 
Haspelmath 2006). 
A challenge for both types of approach is to determine 
which properties can be used in generic statements. Generic 
generalisations range from definitional statements that do 
not tolerate any exceptions (triangles have three sides) to 
statements that involve characteristic properties and are true 
of the majority of the kind with only a few exceptions 
(tigers have stripes) - which are called ‘majority 
characteristic’ by Leslie et al. (2011) - through statements 
that are true of a minority of the kind yet are characteristic 
(ducks lay eggs) - which are called ‘minority characteristic’- 
to statements that have low prevalence but involve a 
property that is noteworthy in some way (sharks attack 
people) - which are called ‘striking’. A further complication 
is that statistical prevalence is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition to license generic generalisations, as 
statements like books are paperbacks may be true of the 
majority of the kind, but are typically judged as false and 
thus fail as generic generalisations (‘false generalisations’). 
In Lazaridou-Chatzigoga, Katsos and Stockall (2015) we 
juxtaposed the linguistic approach to genericity and the 
experimental research investigating the GaD hypothesis and 
we highlighted the significant challenges for each approach. 
We concluded that interdisciplinary work, integrating the 
tools and perspectives of both strands of investigation, is 
needed in order to advance our understanding of genericity. 
In Lazaridou-Chatzigoga, Stockall and Katsos (2017) we 
focused on the effect called ‘Generic Overgeneralisation’ 
(GOG) (Leslie et al. 2011), which has been used to support 
the GaD view on generics. The Generic Overgeneralisation 
(henceforth ‘GOG’) effect is “the tendency to 
overgeneralise the truth of a generic to the truth of the 
corresponding universal statement” (Leslie et al. 2011:17). 
In that paper, we discuss a set of four non-mutually 
exclusive explanations for the GOG effect: a) ignorance of 
the relevant facts, b) subkind (taxonomic) interpretation, c) 
the atypical behaviour of all and d) Quantifier Domain 
Restriction (QDR), which will be explained in more detail 
in the next section. We proposed that all these factors play a 
role in explaining the attested behaviour by adults. These 
factors are independently attested and known to interact 
with the interpretation of generic and quantified statements. 
We suggested that even the name of the GOG effect might 
be misleading. The effect mainly tries to capture the 
behaviour observed with the quantifier all, which 
supposedly gets a generic interpretation as a result of an 
overgeneralisation bias. Thus, perhaps a better name for that 
effect would be ‘Quantifier Reanalysis’ effect, because this 
term would direct the focus where we believe it belongs: on 
the interpretation of all, or more generally of quantifiers, 
rather than the interpretation of generic statements. The 
overall aim in that paper was to showcase the role of 
linguistic factors (both semantic and pragmatic) in the 
interpretation of generic and quantified statements, and to 
underscore the relevance of linguistically motivated 
explanations.  
In this paper, we address the effect of context on generic 
and universally quantified generalisations empirically. 
The GOG effect 
The first detailed investigation of the GOG effect is found in 
Leslie et al. (2011). In their experiment 1, participants 
performed a truth-value judgement task on sentences that 
were presented in one of three forms: generic, universal 
(all), or existential (some). The statements involved 
different kinds of properties: quasi-definitional (triangles 
have three sides), majority characteristic (tigers have 
stripes), minority characteristic (ducks lay eggs), majority 
non-characteristic (cars have radios), striking (pit bulls 
maul children), and false generalisations (Canadians are 
right-handed). The authors report that adults sometimes 
judge universal statements as true, despite knowing that 
they are truth-conditionally false. For example, participants 
judged a quantified statement like all tigers have stripes as 
true, even though they know it is false given that there are 
albino tigers. The authors claim that the participants made 
this ‘error’ because they relied on the corresponding generic 
statement, which is true. They find that the GOG effect is 
restricted to characteristic properties and that it occurs in 
more than half the trials: 78% for majority characteristic and 
51% for minority characteristic statements. 
The authors argue that these elevated acceptance rates are 
due to participants interpreting the ‘false’ universally 
quantified statements as if they were their ‘true’ generic 
counterparts, and are thus a clear case of GOG. Before 
reaching that conclusion, the authors acknowledge three 
alternative explanations, which they argue are ruled out with 
subsequent experiments: a) ignorance of the relevant facts, 
namely, that participants do not know that male ducks do 
not lay eggs, which they ruled out by administering a 
knowledge test that confirmed knowledge of the relevant 
facts (their experiment 3), b) subkind interpretation, 
namely, that participants interpret all ducks lay eggs as ‘all 
kinds/types of ducks lay eggs’, which is a true statement, 
which they discarded through a paraphrase task (their 
experiment 2b), where only 1% of the paraphrases explicitly 
mentioned subkinds, and c) Quantifier Domain Restriction 
(henceforth QDR), to which we turn in the next paragraph. 
Under an explanation based on QDR participants might 
interpret a statement like all ducks lay eggs as applying only 
to a relevant subset of ducks, namely the mature fertile 
female ducks. Quantified statements are interpreted within a 
context, which may restrict the scope of the quantifier (see 
Stanley and Szabó 2000). Thus, the reason why people 
accept the all statement is because (they believe) it is true 
once the quantifier has been restricted to the relevant subset 
of ducks. The authors addressed this alternative explanation 
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in their experiment 2a, where they provided the participants 
with a background context, which was presented before 
each statement. These contexts included artificial population 
estimates of the following form:  
 
(6) ‘‘Suppose the following is true: there are 431 
million ducks in the world. Do you agree with 
the following: all ducks lay eggs.’' 
 
This information was supposed to prime quantification 
over every individual duck in the world, and thereby make it 
difficult/impossible to interpret all as restricted to only the 
ducks that are presupposed by lay eggs. If acceptance of all 
ducks lay eggs in the first experiment was driven by QDR 
the authors predicted that it would disappear in the context 
of population information of the kind above. However, the 
GOG effect still occurred on a substantial portion of trials 
for statements with all, with a 60% acceptance rate for 
majority characteristic statements and 30% for minority 
characteristic statements - less than when the statements 
appeared with no preceding context (78% and 51% 
respectively), but still a high percentage. The authors thus 
concluded that domain restriction could not be the sole 
explanation for the GOG effect.  
On the above grounds, Leslie et al. (2011) rejected all 
three alternative explanations and argued they had found 
evidence for a strong generic bias, according to which 
people sometimes treat universally quantified statements as 
if they were generic.  
Overview of the present study 
In the present study, we addressed QDR as an explanation 
for the GOG effect building on a design used by Lazaridou-
Chatzigoga and Stockall (2013). We chose to focus on the 
relevance of context and QDR given that the latter is a 
pervasive phenomenon affecting quantifiers and their 
interpretation within a context, and is routinely invoked in 
quantification (Heim 1991). According to QDR, the domain 
of a universal quantifier can be restricted in the following 
sense: in a discourse like ‘There was rhubarb pie for 
dessert, Everyone developed a rash’ (example modified 
from von Fintel 1994) a quantifier like everyone does not 
quantify over all the individuals in the world, but rather over 
the contextually restricted set of individuals. Furthermore, 
listeners are known to be charitable (Grice 1975). Thus, in a 
conversation one assumes that speakers take the most 
sensible positions and make the most plausible assertions. 
Under this view, interpreting everyone as quantifying over 
all the individuals in the world seems a rather unlikely 
intended interpretation and moreover one that is not 
charitable to the speaker because it renders her utterance 
false, whereas interpreting everyone with respect to the 
available set of individuals is not only plausible but also 
charitable to the speaker.  
We hypothesised that if we could show that the amount of 
GOG behaviour can be altered by carefully manipulating 
different levels of contextual information preceding the 
critical utterance, we would have evidence that the observed 
tendency to accept universally quantified statements as true 
can be explained through independently motivated 
mechanisms and that there is no need to appeal to GOG.  
Rather than the population statistics contexts used by 
Leslie et al. (2011), which only had a moderate effect on 
participant behaviour, we decided to use three different 
types of contexts. Furthermore, because of the design we 
adopted, we decided to focus only on majority characteristic 
statements (‘tigers have stripes’) leaving minority 
characteristic statements (‘ducks lay eggs’) for future 
investigation. We varied the context preceding the critical 
utterance as follows: a) neutral, where the information in the 
context does not interact with the truth value of the critical 
statement; b) contradictory, where exceptions which should 
rule out a universally quantified statement are made salient, 
and c) supportive, where a paraphrase of the critical 
property is given, which makes its generality salient. Two of 
the three context types (contradictory and supportive) made 
the relevant domain for QDR salient, while the neutral 
context served as a baseline measure. The contradictory and 
supportive contexts turned the implicit restriction to ‘all 
normal’ individuals to an explicit one by either highlighting 
some abnormal individuals (contradictory) or by stating that 
the relevant individuals had the relevant property, i.e. they 
were normal individuals (supportive). 
In addition to manipulating context, however, a 
compelling test of the QDR view also requires testing 
whether the GOG effect is observed only with all or 
whether different universal quantifiers would show such an 
effect. There are reasons to believe that all should not be 
treated as a representative universal quantifier. It has been 
argued to a) participate in fallacious reasoning (Jönsson and 
Hampton 2006), b) be prone to hyperbolic/loose use similar 
to ‘almost all’ (Claridge 2011), and c) be ambiguous 
between distributive and collective interpretation (Beghelli 
and Stowell 1997). Thus, using different types of universal 
quantifiers is essential to test the scope of the GOG effect. 
Furthermore, a study that specifically addresses the 
relevance of QDR should include universal quantifiers with 
different sensitivity to QDR. More specifically, QDR is less 
likely if the universal quantifier used does not require 
linking with a set under discussion, as is the case with all, 
compared to each and all the, which have to be interpreted 
as D(iscourse)-linked (Partee 1995, Pesetsky 1987). 
To recapitulate, (a) the contextual manipulations used 
were expected to make the implicit domain restriction 
explicit and salient to the participants and (b) this 
manipulation was expected to influence truth-value 
judgements by showing a decrease in acceptance rates in the 
contradictory condition and an increase in acceptance rates 
in the supportive condition. 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
120 volunteers (49 male, 70 female, 1 other; aged 19-67; 
mean age 37.28; SD 13.06) participated in the experiment 
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over the Internet. Participants were recruited through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system for human interface 
tasks. All spoke English as their first language and lived in 
the United States. The study was presented in the online 
platform Qualtrics. Each trial consisted of three displays. In 
the first display participants read a background context, in 
the second display they read a statement and in the third 
display they were asked to judge whether they agreed with 
the statement they just read. Their response was recorded by 
selecting keyboard keys (‘A’ for yes and ‘K’ for no). 
 
Materials and design 
Participants were presented with 84 statements, including 48 
fillers presented in a randomised order. The 12 test items 
consisted of majority characteristic statements like tigers 
have stripes and horses have four legs. We included 26 
control items, 12 definitional statements like ants are 
insects and 12 false generalisations like books are 
paperbacks to get baseline measures and to (semi)-
counterbalance the percentage of expected True/False 
responses. All the contexts and items were normed 
beforehand by English native speakers, who did not take 
part in the experiment. This was done to make sure that the 
context manipulations worked as intended. Most of the 
experimental items used are a subset of the items used by 
Leslie et al. (2011). The two conditions we manipulated for 
the majority characteristic items were: a) determiner type: 
bare plural generic/all/all the/each, and b) context type: 
neutral/contradictory/supportive. The statements were 
presented in one of the determiner forms and were preceded 
by one of three types of context: a) neutral, b) contradictory, 
or c) supportive, examples of which are given below: 
 
(7)  
a. neutral context: Linton Zoo is home to three tigers, 
Tibor, Baginda and Kaytlin, whose playful games visitors 
love to watch and photograph. 
b. contradictory context: Linton Zoo is home to three 
tigers, Tibor, Baginda and Kaytlin, whose fur is all white 
due to a recessive gene that controls coat colour. 
c. supportive context: Linton Zoo is home to three tigers, 
Tibor, Baginda and Kaytlin, whose black and orange coats 
visitors love to photograph. 
 
Given the 4 determiners (generic/all/all the/each) we 
created 4 lists with 3 sublists each that varied with respect to 
the pairing of the items with context type, which gave us 12 
lists in total. There were 10 participants in each sublist, who 
were assigned randomly. Here is a sample of a trial of a 





Linton Zoo is home to three tigers, Tibor, Baginda and 
Kaytlin, whose playful games visitors love to watch and 
photograph. 
DISPLAY 2: 
Statement: All tigers have stripes. 
DISPLAY 3:  
Do you agree with the statement? 
o Yes (A)   o No (K) 
 
The definitional and false generalisations were in the 
generic form in all lists. Fillers served to ensure the 
percentage of expected True/False responses was similar. 
The definitional and false generalisations, as well as the 
fillers, were preceded by a context that did not vary across 
conditions. The materials can be viewed at 
http://www.dimitra-lazaridou-chatzigoga.com/cogsci-paper/ 
Results and discussion 
The final model used included 116 out of the 120 
participants. 4 participants were excluded based on their 
responses to definitional statements; we excluded subjects 
that responded correctly at fewer than 10 out of 12 items.  
 
Acceptance rates  
Table 1 summarises the proportion of ‘TRUE’ responses to 
the TVJ question for the test items (majority characteristic 
statements) in each condition. We report proportion of 
‘TRUE’ responses rather than the actual number of 
responses to facilitate comparison with Leslie et al.’s (2011) 
results. 
 
Table 1: Mean Proportion (SE) of ‘TRUE’ responses as a 
function of context and determiner type. 
 
 Context 
 neutral  contradictory supportive 
determiner    
GEN (ø) 99.14 (3.12) 87.07 (0.86) 100 (0) 
all  80.56 (3.82) 48.15 (4.83) 87.96 (3.14) 
all the  78.33 (3.78) 37.50 (4.43) 90 (2.76) 
each  79.17 (3.72) 30.83 (4.23) 85.83 (3.2) 
 
As we see above, generics were accepted at higher rates 
overall than universals, as expected, given that we had 
chosen items that were true in generic form. Both in the 
neutral and the supportive condition acceptance rates for 
generics were at ceiling (99% and 100% respectively) and 
were only lower in the contradictory condition (87%). With 
universals, the picture is more complicated. All three 
universals (all, all the, each) were accepted at similar rates 
in both the neutral and the supportive condition, showing 
only a small increase in the supportive condition. In the 
neutral condition, all-statements were accepted 81% of the 
time, all the-statements 78% of the time and each-
statements 79% of the time. In the supportive condition, all-
statements were accepted 88% of the time, all the-
statements 90% of the time and each-statements 86% of the 
time. Universals after a contradictory context yielded fewer 
acceptances overall, as expected: all-statements were 
accepted 48% of the time, all the-statements 38% of the 
time and each-statements 31% of the time. Acceptance rates 
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for both generics and universals differed significantly 
between the neutral and the contradictory condition. 
On the surface, we do get many ‘TRUE’ responses to 
universal quantifiers, as in the GaD literature, which might 
look like a GOG effect. We predicted that contradictory 
context should decrease acceptances across the board, while 
supportive context should increase them. We expected a 
smaller effect for generics because the generic statements 
were constructed so as to be true and because of their 
resistance to contextual restriction (i.e. we expected ceiling 
effects) and we predicted differences between the universal 
Qs depending on their sensitivity to QDR/D-linking. 
Nevertheless, we had specific predictions about the relative 
rates depending on the level of context, which according to 
Leslie et al. should not differ. In order to appreciate the 
relative effect of context on acceptance rates, we subtracted 
the average means of the contradictory condition from the 
average means of the neutral condition, as well as the 
average means of the supportive condition from the average 
means of the neutral. We took acceptance rates in the 
neutral condition as our baseline plotted at 0. Negative 
values mean fewer acceptances and positive values mean 
more acceptances. We interpreted the rates obtained as the 
relative effect of context on acceptance rates plotted in 
figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: The relative effect of context. 
 
We get the effect for the contradictory context exactly as 
predicted for the universal Qs. The relative effect is bigger 
for those quantifiers that require QDR because of their 
semantics (all the, each) than for the one that allows but 
does not require QDR to the relevant subset (all). We also 
find that context does affect GEN in the contradictory 
context.  
The prediction about the supportive context was not borne 
out because of ceiling effects in the neutral condition. 
Adding explicit information supporting the statement hardly 
mattered, as acceptance rates did not rise significantly. The 
ceiling effect might be due to participants being charitable 
and/or exceptions not being immediately salient.  
 
We used R (R Core Team, 2012) and the lme4 package 
(Bates et al. 2015) to perform a generalised mixed-effects 
linear analysis of the relationship between determiner and 
context, specifying a binomial family. Responses were 
treated as a dummy coded categorical variable and were 
modelled with glmer. First, we fitted a full model with 
det.type and context.type as fixed effects (with an 
interaction term) and with random intercepts for subjects 
and items. We performed a likelihood ratio test of the full 
model with an interaction term against a model without the 
interaction term and the comparison proved non-significant 
(χ2(6) = 8.3455, p = 0.2139). Thus, including an interaction 
term did not improve model fit, so we used the model 
without the interaction term for all subsequent 
analyses/comparisons. 
We then fitted versions of the full model, in which a single 
effect was removed and we compared the reduced model to 
the model without interaction. To test the main effect of 
context, we removed context. A likelihood ratio test of the 
model without interaction against the model without context 
proved highly significant (χ2(2) = 311.81, p < 2.2e-16). 
Thus, we concluded that there was a main effect of context. 
To test the main effect of determiner, we removed 
determiner. A likelihood ratio test of the model without 
interaction against the model without determiner proved 
highly significant (χ2(3) = 58.183, p = 1.436e-12). Thus, we 
concluded that there was a main effect of determiner. 
General Discussion 
We set out to explore one of the alternative explanations for 
the judgement data that concern universally quantified 
statements, which have been used as evidence of a GOG 
effect. The study presented here provides experimental 
evidence for the relevance of a QDR-based explanation of 
the purported GOG effect. In our study, context did not only 
affect acceptance rates for all and other universal quantifiers 
(all the, each), but it further predicted the levels of QDR 
depending on the level of context. The effect of context was 
greater for all the and each, two quantifiers that require 
QDR, while it was smaller for all, whose domain is only 
optionally restricted. Leslie et al. had ruled out the relevance 
of context and hence predicted no differences in acceptances 
across contexts for all. Furthermore, even though they only 
discuss all they make general claims about (universal) 
quantification being prone to the GOG effect. We argue that 
drawing conclusions about universal quantification (and by 
extension about genericity) requires more subtle 
manipulations. The differences we found between the 
different universal quantifiers are predicted according to the 
QDR view advanced here, but ought to be inconsistent with 
the GaD view, were they to discuss them.  
We also find that context matters for generics too, a fact 
that bears further investigation, but is in line with recent 
work that claims that generics display some context 
sensitivity (Sterken 2015). This might be more consistent 
with an analysis in which GEN also involves (some form of) 
quantification rather than one that treats GEN as 
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categorically/ontologically different from universal 
quantifiers. 
Overall, we argue that there exist alternative explanations 
for big portions of the supposed GOG effect. The study 
discussed here did not address all the alternatives, but so far 
in the literature it has been shown that at least pure error, 
ignorance and now context all significantly affect 
acceptance rates. In work in progress, we address cross-
linguistic variation in the realisation of generic and 
universal generalisations. The general thrust of this work is 
that, rather than being under the influence of a default bias, 
adults are simply sensitive to the subtle interplay of 
quantifier semantics and pragmatics on the one hand, and 
context on the other. This approach has the advantage of 
accounting for data without postulating ad-hoc mechanisms 
such as GOG just for generics. 
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